Why do they hate us?

Last summer a leaked National Intelligence Estimate predicted a bleak Iraqi future through 2005; “tenuous stability” is the best case scenario and "Civil War" is likely. National Intelligence Estimates are the most important intelligence briefings put out by the American intelligence community for the President. This was a “pessimistic” report compared to the public statements by the President. When Bush won the last election one of his strengths was the War on Terrorism. It is widely perceived that he is “steadfast” and willing to “stay the course” in the global fight. Americans were confident in his ability to win the "War on Terror." He makes "unpopular decisions" and stands by his “moral convictions.” These are of course ubiquitous expressions carried by the mainstream press to describe our opinions.

In several speeches, Bush has framed Iraq as the most important front for the “War on Terror.” This indicates that our operation in Iraq is not only aimed at defeating an authoritarian regime and its remnants, but is aimed at undermining the global wave of Islamic militancy. The Pentagon Defense Science board released a 102 page report to the public critical of current policy and mindset. It demolishes the notion that the militant movement is fueled by an irrational hatred for "our freedoms." Instead they note that policy and diplomacy are at fault and the current "course" which we are "steadfastly sticking to" is hardening formerly “non-violent” Muslims and increasing anti-American sentiment around the world.

Opinion surveys conducted by Zogby International, the Pew Research Center, Gallup (CNN/USA Today), and the Department of State (INR) reveal widespread animosity toward the United States and its policies. A year and a half after going to war in Iraq, Arab/Muslim anger has intensified. Data from Zogby International in July 2004, for example, show that the U.S. is viewed unfavorably by overwhelming majorities in Egypt (98 percent), Saudi Arabia (94 percent), Morocco (88 percent), and Jordan (78 percent). The war has increased mistrust of America in Europe, weakened support for the war on terrorism, and undermined U.S. credibility worldwide. Media commentary is consistent with polling data. In a State Department (INR) survey of editorials and op-eds in 72 countries, 82.5 % of commentaries were negative, 17.5% positive.

Negative attitudes and the conditions that create them are the underlying sources of threats to America’s national security and reduced ability to leverage diplomatic opportunities. Terrorism, thin coalitions, harmful effects on business, restrictions on travel, declines in cross border tourism and education flows, and damaging consequences for other elements of U.S. soft power are tactical manifestations of a pervasive atmosphere of hostility.

Although many observers correlate anti-Americanism with deficiencies in U.S. public diplomacy (its content, tone, and competence), the effectiveness of the means used to influence public opinion is only one metric. Policies, conflicts of interest, cultural differences, memories, time, dependence on mediated information, and other factors shape perceptions and limit the effectiveness of strategic communication.

The paper notes that the war has created an almost unanimous negative opinion in the Arab world. These negative perceptions hurt American interests on every level as the paper notes. It continues, drawing its analysis on the basis of “more than 15 private sector and Congressional reports” which have examined public diplomacy; "the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World, the Council on Foreign Relations, The Heritage Foundation, The Brookings Institution, The Aspen Institute, the Public Diplomacy Institute, the Center for the Study of the Presidency, and several reports each by the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, the U.S. General Accounting Office, and Congressional committees.”

They remark that “the consensus in these reports [is] that U.S. public diplomacy is in crisis. Missing are strong leadership, strategic direction, adequate coordination, sufficient resources, and a culture of measurement and evaluation. America’s image problem, many suggest, is linked to perceptions of the United States as arrogant, hypocritical, and self-indulgent.” These problems are not new. When Eisenhower was president he made many of the same remarks. His advisors told him that the Arab perception of the US as a nation interested only in securing their own economic interests and willingness to support harsh authoritarian regimes were difficult to combat because they were true. And so it goes.

The report continues with harsh criticism. “There is agreement too that public diplomacy could be a powerful asset with stronger Presidential leadership, Congressional support, inter-agency coordination, partnership with the private sector, and resources (people, tools, structures, programs, funding).” They seem to be prescribing a mass public relations campaign, however in the next breath they continue, “Solutions lie not in short term, manipulative public relations. Results will depend on fundamental transformation of strategic communication instruments and a sustained long term, approach at the level of ideas, cultures, and values.”

The report analyzes how to win the “War on Terror” and prescribes fundamental changes to the framework with which we view the militant movement. It is not enough to simplify issues and they note that the “terrorism frame marginalizes other significant issues and problems: failing states, non-proliferation, HIV/AIDS pandemic, economic globalization, transnational threats other than terrorism, and global warming… The terrorism frame directs attention to tactics not strategy. The focus is more on capturing and killing terrorists than attitudinal, political, and economic forces that are the underlying source of threats and opportunities in national security” which are what crystallize and mobilize people to militant action. We are very good at fighting symptoms but ignore the causes.

The way to stop Islamic militancy is to focus on humanitarian missions instead of “capturing and killing terrorist.” The fight is a political and economic fight. If we kill several thousand militants without changing the legitimate source of their grievances then nothing is accomplished. We are essentially fighting the birthrates of foreign populations who are increasingly "marginalized" and resentful of American policy. However, as has often been the case we are in a situation where we are strong militarily and weak politically.

The authors note that “American direct intervention in the Muslim World has paradoxically elevated the stature of and support for radical Islamists, while diminishing support for the United States to single-digits in some Arab societies.” The report goes on to deconstruct Bush’s theory that they “hate our freedom.”

• Muslims do not “hate our freedom,” but rather, they hate our policies. The overwhelming majority voice their objections to what they see as one-sided support in favor of Israel and against Palestinian rights, and the longstanding, even increasing support for what Muslims collectively see as tyrannies, most notably Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Pakistan, and the Gulf states.

• Thus when American public diplomacy talks about bringing democracy to Islamic societies, this is seen as no more than self-serving hypocrisy. Moreover, saying that “freedom is the future of the Middle East” is seen as patronizing, suggesting that Arabs are like the enslaved peoples of the old Communist World — but Muslims do not feel this way: they feel oppressed, but not enslaved.

• Furthermore, in the eyes of Muslims, American occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq
has not led to democracy there, but only more chaos and suffering. U.S. actions appear in contrast to be motivated by ulterior motives, and deliberately controlled in order to best serve American national interests at the expense of truly Muslim self determination.

• Therefore, the dramatic narrative since 9/11 has essentially borne out the entire radical Islamist bill of particulars. American actions and the flow of events have elevated the authority of the Jihadi insurgents and tended to ratify their legitimacy among Muslims. Fighting groups portray themselves as the true defenders of an Ummah (the entire Muslim community) invaded and under attack — to broad public support.

• What was a marginal network is now an Ummah-wide movement of fighting groups. Not only has there been a proliferation of “terrorist” groups: the unifying context of a shared cause creates a sense of affiliation across the many cultural and sectarian boundaries that divide Islam.

• Finally, Muslims see Americans as strangely narcissistic — namely, that the war is all about us. As the Muslims see it, everything about the war is — for Americans — really no more than an extension of American domestic politics and its great game. This perception is of course necessarily heightened by election-year atmospherics, but nonetheless sustains their impression that when Americans talk to Muslims they are really just talking to themselves.

They continue to remark on American perceptions of the world and of themselves.

Americans believe that while the U.S. necessarily shapes foreign policies to support our national interests, those same interests are not necessarily in opposition to the interests of other nations and cultures. To the contrary, Americans are convinced that the U.S. is a benevolent 'superpower' that elevates values emphasizing freedom and prosperity as at the core of its own national interest. Thus, for Americans, 'U.S. values' are in reality 'world values' — exemplified by the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights or the 1975 Helsinki Accords — so deep down we assume that everyone should naturally support our policies.

Yet the world of Islam — by overwhelming majorities at this time — sees things differently. Muslims see American policies as inimical to their values, American rhetoric about freedom and democracy as hypocritical, and American actions as deeply threatening.

In other words, they do not hate us “for our freedom” but because of our policies. This is a truth so easily derived from all available evidence. The “War on Terror” has drastically increased anti-American feeling in the Arab world. The report notes that this has “not yet bottomed-out” as the “Jihadi message – that strongly attacks American values – is being accepted by more moderate and non-violent Muslims.” The negative opinion is “continuing to move dynamically.”

The movement is now qualitative rather and quantitative, meaning that regular Muslims are moving from “soft opposition” toward “hard opposition.” In Saudi Arabia, a large majority believes that the U.S. seeks to “weaken” and “dominate” Islam itself — in other words, Americans have become the enemy. It is noteworthy that opinion is hardest over against America in precisely those places ruled by what Muslims call “apostates” and tyrants — the tyrants we support. This should give us pause.

I could not agree more.