Tuesday, June 28, 2005

A Framework For Regime Change

As conceded in the internal planning documents leaked by the British government, the Iraq war was motivated by the desire for regime change in Iraq. The British were concerned because regime change is not a legal justification for the use of force; the three justifications are 1) self defense, 2) Security Council Authorization, and 3) Humanitarian intervention. They realized that self defense and humanitarian intervention could not be used so they put a lot of thought into how to be “clever” enough to “wrongfoot Saddam” on UN Security Council Resolutions. What some may wonder, quite naturally, is why shouldn’t regime change be a just cause for war if the regime in question is as bad as Saddam’s? Are the established international laws antiquated? There is the possibility that some international laws are similar to the many obscure laws still on the books in the US; they usually resemble something like ‘it is illegal to walk a pig at noon on Main Street.’ The question of legality may be a technical one in this case, since the regime that was changed was unquestionably wicked and illegitimate. When the cowboy-hero kills the villain in Hollywood westerns it may be illegal – but the hero is doing good and the audience forgives him because they wish they could do the same. Perhaps this crude analogy captures the essence of whatever support Bush gets from Americans who don’t care about the ‘stodgy’ legal criticism. He may be a vigilante, but he is a good vigilante.

There are perhaps, other considerations.

For one thing, based on numerous reports the consequences of regime change are messy. That is a sterile way of saying that thousands upon thousands are dead or maimed, economic and health standards have dramatically declined and lawlessness has increased in Iraq because of the war. Some may argue that the price of freedom is a heavy one. But before considering the proper cost benefit analysis for freedom an important principle should be considered; the price paid by Iraqis to get rid of a tyrant is not something foreigners should determine. That should be a concept anyone who understands and values self-determination accepts. It is not enough to say that Saddam is gone so we have done well and leave it at that. The question of whether or not he should go is the wrong one; the only relevant questions are at whose and what cost and who should determine those costs. The military operation for regime change in Iraq is a continuation of a failed policy. There is much to be learned from the entire experience.

Looking ahead:

The sanctions supported and enforced by the U.S. and Britain, condemned by much of the world, were counterproductive. They were in effect a form of wholesale state supported terrorism, responsible for hundreds of thousands of deaths due to starvation, non-potable water, and inadequate medical supplies. Two UN officials with years of service charged with administrating the sanctions in Iraq resigned in protest, calling them “genocidal.” And they were designed specifically for this purpose.[1] Both of these observations are conceded both within the internal policy record and in public statements. The hope was that if the Iraqi civilian population was weakened and angry enough they would overthrow the regime themselves. But the opposite happened. The sanctions weakened the civilian population and strengthened the regime. People became dependant on the state for what little food they could get. The brightest individuals focused on leaving the country. And the sanctions provided Saddam with an excuse to divert attention from his own crimes. The reform and revolution that western policy planners hoped for is possible when the civilian population becomes strong and the government weak. The sanctions regime had the opposite effect. They were the first try at regime change. The war was the second. But the question remains, should regime change be added as a legal justification for the use of force alongside the established three?

Let’s approach the issue from another angle. If regime change is to be a viable reason for war then we need to establish a framework to outline the conditions that a government must satisfy to be eligible and who makes the determination to go forward with the process. Currently it is the UN Security Council. The new precedent established by the U.S. is of unilateral decision-making. The US cobbled together a coalition of governments who went along with their decision outside of the UN Security Council. Many countries were coerced with threats of economic punishment for noncompliance and promises of economic enticements of postwar contracts for allegiance. Several countries objected to the war because it would threaten their economic interests, Russia and France most notably. The countries that did go along did so against the popular opinion of their constituencies, often by large margins. The coalition was a collection of autocratic decision-making. And there was no desire for war outside of the US. This is why is fair to call it unilateral action. Therefore by precedent the need for regime change can be determined unilaterally and by a foreign government with enough clout to coerce others into joining. The consequences that follow should be clear.

We are left with the question of what governments are eligible for regime change. In this case it was clear that Saddam was an illegitimate ruler; with every mass grave uncovered the horrors of his regime are laid bare for the world to see. But not every case is as clear-cut. Historically this has been a decision that people living under the rule of tyranny made for themselves. We need to define ‘illegitimate.’ A good place to start is the principle of democracy. We all should accept that governments should be elected democratically in free and open elections. Our first principle is that any dictator, unelected ruler, or fraudulently elected ruler, no matter how malevolent or benevolent, is illegitimate and qualifies for regime change. How does the principle hold up in reality? In the case of Saddam Hussein it clearly applies. But consider several other examples.

Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez has been elected, saved from a U.S. supported coup by popular protest, and won a public referendum to reaffirm his presidency that was verified as being “secret and free” by an independent observer whose findings were published in the London journal The Economist. After Chavez survived his brief coup the White House said that although Chavez “was democratically elected… legitimacy is something that is conferred not just by a majority of voters.”[2] Chavez has agitated the Bush administration with his leftist rhetoric and outspoken criticism of American foreign policy in Latin America. The free press have labeled him a (democratically elected) “strongman” whose land reforms and oil industry nationalization are “undermining the foundations of democracy and free enterprise” in Venezuela. Chavez is “the elected but increasingly authoritarian” president ruling with a “façade of democracy.” His obstinacy warrants the historical response of “direct U.S. intervention;” which of course “however benign, risks regional rejection of Yanqui imperialism.” The Latin Americans never seem to understand the bigger picture, foolishly resenting “benign” “U.S. intervention” only aimed at preventing the “breakdown of democracy.” The quoted words come from several articles in the mainstream press.[3] There are some examples of recent “benign U.S. intervention” mistakenly seen as “Yanqui imperialism” that should allay any fears in “our backyard” down there.

For example the U.S. supported coup of the democratically elected Guatemalan president Jacob Arbenz in 1954 that led to decades of dictatorships and rightwing death squads that terrorized peasants. Arbenz’s crime against democracy was his land reform program that offended the multinational corporation United Fruit. Or perhaps the U.S. supported coup of another democratically elected president, Chile’s Salvador Allende in 1974. After he was murdered in the capital building sending out pleas for help on the radio while bombs rained down overhead in a military coup, Augusto Pinochet took over and ruled with an iron fist for the next two decades. The U.S. took a very active role in the coup and Pinochet’s rule. He killed thousands of citizens and oversaw an international terrorist operation, Operation Condor, that went too far when it detonated a car bomb in the streets of Washington D.C. Or for the under 30 crowd, perhaps they remember the US support of the terrorist Contras in Nicaragua and the training of rightwing death squads in several Latin American countries including the Alcatl battalion in El Salvador that immediately after being trained by US forces went on a massacre in the El Mozote region and slaughtered hundreds of women and children; or Washington’s friend Roberto D’Aubuisson who ordered the assassination of the Archbishop Oscar Romero as he said mass hours after begging Washington to quit supporting the death squads that were indiscriminately killing peasants. Or perhaps the invasions of Grenada and Panama to capture an ex-CIA thug may still be clouding their appreciation for “benign” U.S. intervention; or the ongoing “benign” interventions in Columbia, coming in the form of massive arms sales to the right wing death squads terrorizing dissidents and political opponents under the pretense of a war on drugs. The sordid details of the above are all well documented elsewhere.[4] The memories of the 1980s must be particularly frightening since many of the men in power then are back in power under the second Bush. The Bush administration dislikes Chavez, and claims that although he “was democratically elected, legitimacy is something that is conferred not just by a majority of the voters.” The Bush administration has allowed its distaste for Chavez to mock its own war on terror by refusing to honor an extradition request from Venezuela for the well-documented terrorist, Luis Posada Carriles, who committed crimes in Venezuela among other places. Among his crimes is the bombing of a civilian Cuban airliner that killed 73 people as well as a string of bombings in several Cuban hotels. After those crimes he worked for the U.S. running guns and drugs for Oliver North and the contras in Nicaragua.

So what makes the democratically elected Chavez a ‘strongman’? He is opposed to American power in South America, and has threatened to sell oil to other countries. In spite of the venomous rhetoric from both sides, business as usual has continued between the U.S. and Venezuela. The real issue is Venezuelan oil. Chavez has threatened to sell the oil to other countries. Senator Christopher Dodd from Connecticut has said that it is “critically important to have that continuing flow of oil.” Chavez has also aligned himself with the Cuban dictator Fidel Castro, an official enemy of the U.S. Chavez claims it is an alliance meant to counterbalance U.S. power in the region. Chavez’s willingness to fraternize with a dictator with a history of political oppression is an example of how dangerous Chavez is. And indeed, alliances with autocrats are worrisome. But we might want to consider broader implications if we decide to add Chavez to the list of illegitimate rulers based on these qualifications. The U.S. has several allies and friends that are dictators. Their power is not derived from elections but from their ability to hold onto it by oppressing their constituents. Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan is one such ruler, along with Musharaf in Pakistan, and the increasingly authoritarian Vladimir Putin in Russia.

In Karimov’s case he has caused a public relations problem for the U.S. because his military recently massacred several hundred political protestors. He has a history of horrible human rights abuses. The units responsible for the massacre were supplied with US arms and training. Several news agencies reported a subsequent cover-up; Karimov’s soldiers hid bodies of unarmed women and men to make it look like it was an armed riot. When NATO ordered an investigation, U.S. and British defense officials blocked the investigation. For several years his military and intelligence agencies have been notorious for torturing dissidents. In one publicized account the British embassy found that two prisoners were boiled to death. But he has enjoyed U.S. support for years, under the pretense of the war on terror; receiving training, vocal support, and millions in aid in return for the use of a military base. After some popular protest the U.S. suspended a small amount of aid in 2004. The aid was slotted for a program to secure nuclear material and it was later discovered the money was reallocated through another channel so that there was no net decrease.[5]

Or consider other strongmen the U.S. supports; Heydar Aliyev and his son Ilham Aliyev in Azerbaijan. The U.S. state department notes in its 2004 Human Rights report that although Ilham was elected, the “ballot did not meet international standards for a democratic election due to numerous, serious irregularities.” The State Department continued, “The Government's human rights record remained poor, and it continued to commit numerous abuses. The Government continued to restrict the right of citizens to peacefully change their government. There were four deaths that occurred in custody allegedly due to beatings. Police tortured and beat persons in custody, and used excessive force to extract confessions... Prison conditions remained harsh and life threatening, and some prisoners died as a result of these conditions… Arbitrary arrest and detention and lengthy pretrial detention continued to be problems. After the October 2003 presidential elections, authorities conducted a wave of politically motivated arrests of more than 700 persons, including, opposition members, journalists and election officials.” But there is good news. The LA Times notes that both have been “staunch supporters of the West’s oil ambitions… and military campaigns.” They have allowed the construction of an oil pipeline that is an “advantage … to [U.S.] strategic interests in the region.” President Bush called the pipeline deal “the contract of the century.”[6] Chavez has his communist strongman in Cuba; the U.S. has its ex-communist strongmen in East Asia. In light of these facts, we may yet decide to add unsavory political alliances to the proposed framework lest we expose ourselves to attack.

A coherent framework for regime change has thus far been difficult to develop. Democracy is not a qualification as dictators are given crucial support and democratically elected leaders are undermined and considered illegitimate. Unsavory political alliances cannot be allowed either, as every government in the world may qualify if this is the case, even the United States. Maybe it should be a smell test. To proceed one must accept “the premise of… highhandedness” that “the United States is, on balance, a force for good in the world,” using its superpower status “not to subjugate others but to allow them to live freely.” If a government is, “on balance”, “a force for good” then they are ineligible for regime change. But there is a catch; who determines the weights on the balance? That is a question of strength, if the nation in question has the military power to make the determination then it does. This is the smell test proposed by the editorial board at the Washington Post. We clearly have some work to do. The unspoken principle underlying this line of thought is power. If you are powerful enough to determine who is “on balance, a force for good,” including yourself, then you have the right to do so. This is a dubious doctrine to follow, the trap of rationalization and self-delusion await us. When studying other governments a similar rationalization is readily apparent; no government considers itself a force for evil. The Russian invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s was to protect the Afghanis from outside agitators. The Japanese conquest of Asia during WWII was liberation from colonial rule. The Nazis expelled Jews to save the motherland, and invaded Poland in self-defense. The British oppression in India was for the good of the savages, an extension of the ‘white man’s burden.’ The genocidal conquest of Native Americans was for the advancement of civilized people. Every government or ruler is doing something for a greater good in his or her own judgment. If we see this line of reasoning for the rationalization and self-serving rhetoric that it is then we are left with one principle; might makes right. As the British see it “American hegemon.” If you are powerful enough to determine the rules then you do.

This begins to get at the heart of the matter. If the powerful are left to determine the goodness or righteousness of their actions then what is to stop them from acting not for good, but in self-interest? Nothing. The U.S. government was designed to be a system of checks and balances between three branches; this was to prevent any one individual or group from becoming to powerful and becoming a tyranny. The American people would never accept the idea that a single individual should rule domestic politics outside of this check and balance system and determine whether or not he or she is a force for good. It is just as dangerous to ignore the rule of law abroad, no matter the short-term goal.

Notes:
[1] See for example Nagy, Thomas J. “The Secret Behind the Sanctions. How the US intentionally destroyed Iraq’s Water Supply.” The Progressive. September 2001.
Specifically note the internal documents he obtained.
Over the last two years, I've discovered documents of the Defense Intelligence Agency proving beyond a doubt that, contrary to the Geneva Convention, the U.S. government intentionally used sanctions against Iraq to degrade the country's water supply after the Gulf War. The United States knew the cost that civilian Iraqis, mostly children, would pay, and it went ahead anyway.
The primary document, "Iraq Water Treatment Vulnerabilities," is dated January 22, 1991. It spells out how sanctions will prevent Iraq from supplying clean water to its citizens.

"Iraq depends on importing specialized equipment and some chemicals to purify its water supply, most of which is heavily mineralized and frequently brackish to saline," the document states. "With no domestic sources of both water treatment replacement parts and some essential chemicals, Iraq will continue attempts to circumvent United Nations Sanctions to import these vital commodities. Failing to secure supplies will result in a shortage of pure drinking water for much of the population. This could lead to increased incidences, if not epidemics, of disease."

In cold language, the document spells out what is in store: "Iraq will suffer increasing shortages of purified water because of the lack of required chemicals and desalination membranes. Incidences of disease, including possible epidemics, will become probable unless the population were careful to boil water."

The document gives a timetable for the destruction of Iraq's water supplies. "Iraq's overall water treatment capability will suffer a slow decline, rather than a precipitous halt," it says. "Although Iraq is already experiencing a loss of water treatment capability, it probably will take at least six months (to June 1991) before the system is fully degraded."
[2] On the referendum and elections see McCoy, Jennifer. “What Really Happened in Venezuela?” The Economist, 2 September 2004.
For Bush’s reaction to Chavez’s survival see Jones, Terry. “If you want a free vote, ask nicely” The Observer, 24 April 2001
[3] Various quotes taken from the following:
Harman, Danna. “Latin strongman rebels against US-centric news.” Christian Science Monitor. 13 May 2005
Webb, Andy. “Bush Orders Policy to ‘contain’ Chavez.” The Financial Times. 13 March 2005
Editorial. “Nonsense from Hugo Chavez.” Los Angelos Times, 28 January 2005
Editorial. “A Threat to Latin Democracy.” Washington Post, 21 March 2005
Diehl, Jackson. “The Façade of Latin Democracy.” Washington Post, 6 June 2005
Editorial. “Venezuela’s ‘Revolution’.” Washington Post, 14 January 2005
[4] For the story of the massacre at El Mozote and the Alcatl battalion, see Danner, Mark. Massacre at El Mozote (1994). Vintage
The story of Nicaragua and the Reagan administration see Reagan versus the Sandinistas: The undeclared war on Nicaragua (1987). Westview Press
For more on United Fruit and other corporations influence on foreign policy in Latin America see LaFeber, Walter. Inevitable Revolutions The United States in Central America (1984). New York: W.W. Norton & Company
For details on the American intervention in Columbia see Stokes, Doug. Americas other war: Terrorizing Columbia (2005). Zed Books.
[5] More here, and here.
[6] See Murphy, Kim. “Caspian Sea Pipeline has its origins in Turbulent Waters.” Los Angelos Times, 27 June 2005

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