The Propagandists

“In 1895, Gustave Le Bon wrote that for a leader to effectively communicate his ideas to the masses, the ideas must be presented “in the guise of images, and are only accessible to the masses under this form. … These image-like ideas are not connected by any logical bond … and may take each other’s place like the slides of a magic lantern which the operator withdraws from the groove in which they were placed one above the other.” (491)

Typecasting: On the Arts & Sciences of Human Inequality
Elizabeth Ewen, Stuart Ewen [Seven Stories Press, 2006]

That the manufacture of consent is capable of great refinements no one, I think, denies. The process by which public opinions arise is certainly no less intricate than it has appeared in these pages and the opportunities for manipulation open to anyone who understands the process are plain enough.

The creation of consent is not a new art. It is a very old one which was supposed to have died out with the appearance of democracy. But it has not died out. It has, in fact, improved enormously in technic, because it is now based on analysis rather than on rule of thumb. And so, as a result of psychological research, coupled with the modern means of communication, the practice of democracy has turned a corner. A revolution is taking place, infinitely more significant than any shifting of economic power.

Within the life of the generation now in control of affairs, persuasion has become a self-conscious art and a regular organ of popular government. None of us begins to understand the consequences, but it is no daring prophecy to say that the knowledge of how to create consent will alter every political calculation and modify every political premise...It has been demonstrated that we cannot rely upon intuition, conscience, or the accidents of casual opinion if we are to deal with the world beyond our reach. (158)
...
The lesson is, I think, a fairly clear one. In the absence of institutions and education by which the environment is so successfully reported that the realities of public life stand out sharply against self-centered opinion, the common interests very largely elude public opinion entirely, and can be managed only by a specialized class whose personal interests reach beyond the locality. This class is irresponsible, for it acts upon information that is not common property, in situations that the public at large does not conceive, and it can be held to account only on the accomplished fact. (195)

Public Opinion
Walter Lippmann [Free Press, 1965]

I.
Le Bon and Lippmann were experts on how to manage public opinion from slightly different perspectives. Le Bon describes how political leaders behave while Lippman took on the role of the media. Lippmann posits that the media’s function in a democratic society is the “manufacture of consent” of the governed. The media helps political leaders sell what Le Bon calls “image-like ideas” that “are not connected by any logical bond” to the public. What does it mean to refer to “image-like ideas” devoid of “any logical bonds”? Take Iraq for example, a conflict justified by an endless parade of conflicting reasons. Initially, the single reason was in self defense from Iraq’s WMDs, and then it morphed into a democracy building project, then a flypaper trap for Al Qaeda so we wouldn’t have to fight them in the streets of San Francisco, and now, finally, to prevent Iran from dominating the region.

I am simplifying a bit because those justifications did not follow sequentially. They are often employed simultaneously and overlap, which only strengthens my point about their logical incoherence and inconsistency. Le Bon’s image-like ideas “may take each other’s place like the slides of a magic lantern which the operator” continually manipulates to best suit whatever the current situation. They are discarded and interchanged depending on the immediate needs of the moment. If we need to appear benevolent and caring, democracy it is. If the people no longer want to build democracy then scare them by claiming we have to fight over there lest they follow us home. If that doesn’t work, appeal to economic interests and jingoism; Iran is going to take over the region and its oil if we leave. Go back to democracy. The WMDs are in Syria. And on and on.

It is important to take note of Walter Lippmann's importance in the field of American journalism in light of his belief that the general public was incapable of understanding “common interests” and had to be managed by a “specialized class”; the media. His is a very dim view of democracy.

So how does this translate in today’s modern world? Le Bon’s formulation should be obvious. Lippmann’s is a bit subtler; after all, there is no journalism school that teaches students to deceive the public. Lippmann’s professional values are deeply internalized cultural values and likely remain mostly invisible to the individual. I will not speculate on how this process works or delve into a discussion about culture. (See Geert Hofstede for example.) It much easier to see how Lippmann’s ideas manifest themselves in journalism than individuals, as we shall see.

One way in which this manifests is in the use of media code-words. Political writing and speech is a form of bureaucratic patois, often with several layers of meaning. It often sounds like it means one thing when the reality is something quite different. So what are code words and what do they do? Code-words serve several ends. The first is that they obfuscate the real intent of the writer, but they are misleading in such a way that many readers think they understand the intent. The deception is more than likely often self-deception as well. Humans tend to use cold, euphemistic, and bureaucratic language to elide uncomfortable realities. This is partly what Hannah Arendt called the “banality of evil.” Second, the use of code words sets the acceptable boundaries of debate by their implied assumptions. This may be a bit abstract and conceptual so I will discuss a few examples to demonstrate how this works.

II.

“Indeed, democratization is the most intriguing part of the administration's gamble in Iraq. The creation of a stable and united Iraqi democracy would be a tremendous accomplishment, with beneficial repercussions in other Arab societies. But was invading Iraq the right way to start building democratic momentum in the Arab world?”

Bridges, Bombs, or Bluster?
Madeleine Albright
Foreign Affairs, September/October 2003

“An exit strategy … must be a victory strategy that recognizes U.S. vital interests at stake in Iraq and the good our nation can do when we are committed to serving the cause of freedom in a violent, dangerous place that can, in the end, only be made less threatening and more stable by the success of our political ideals.

The American people understand the need to build a new Iraq from the ashes of Saddam Hussein's murderous regime”

U.S. Situation in Iraq and Afghanistan
Senator John McCain
Council on Foreign Relations, November 5, 2003

“The United States of America must understand it's in our interests that we help this democracy succeed. As a matter of fact, it's in our interests that we help reformers across the Middle East achieve their objectives. … [Failure] would give the terrorists and extremists an additional tool besides safe haven, and that is revenues from oil sales.”

George Bush
White House Press Conference, August 2006

“US foreign policy around the world—and especially in the Middle East—rests increasingly on this belief that a more democratic world not only coincides with American values but is consistent with America’s interests as well”

Realism and Idealism: US Policy toward Saudi Arabia, from the Cold War to Today
Bradley Bowman
Paramaters, Winter 2005-06

“There is no magic formula to solve the problems of Iraq. However, there are actions that can be taken to improve the situation and protect American interests.

Many Americans are dissatisfied, not just with the situation in Iraq but with the state of our political debate regarding Iraq. (4)
…
The United States has long-term relationships and interests at stake in the Middle East, and needs to stay engaged. (4)
…
We believe it is still possible to pursue different policies that can give Iraq an opportunity for a better future, combat terrorism, stabilize a critical region of the world, and protect America’s credibility, interests, and values. (4)
...
Most of the region’s countries are wary of U.S. efforts to promote democracy in Iraq and the Middle East.(24)
…
Several U.S.-based organizations have employed substantial resources to help Iraqis develop their democracy. (26)
…
We believe that it could enable a responsible transition that will give the Iraqi people a chance to pursue a better future, as well as serving America’s interests and values in the years ahead. (31)

The Iraq Study Group Report
James Baker and Lee Hamilton, January 2007

“We are pursuing the amorphous task of coaxing out of the Iraqi people and government political decisions that will result in a democratic, pluralistic society that is conducive to regional stability.
…
U.S. bargaining power in the Middle East is growing. Moderate Arab states understand that the United States is an indispensable counterweight to Iran.
…
The president and Congress must reach a consensus on how to protect our broader strategic interests… we need to defend our vital interests in the Middle East.

Beyond Baghdad
Richard Lugar
Washington Post, 30 January 2007

“Iran is going to have to understand that the United States will protect its interests…”

U.S. Diplomat Tells Iran to Back Off.
Associated Press, 23 January 2007

“If Iran responds with escalation [to U.S. aggression], it has the means to put U.S. citizens and national interests at greater risk in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere.”

Dafna Linzer
Washington Post, 26 January 2007

“Americans are having a debate bout how to proceed in Iraq, but we are not having a strategic debate about retracting American power and influence. What’s most important about this debate is what doesn’t need to be said. No major American leader doubts that America must remain, as Dean Acheson put it, the locomotive of the world.”

The Iraq Syndrome, R.I.P.
David Brooks
New York Times, 1 February 2007

“Interests”, “credibility”, the “American people”, “moderate”, “democratization.” These are the basic idioms of political patois. Each term has subtle meanings that obfuscate from the public what is actually being discussed. If language matters, and it does, it is valuable to think about what we are actually saying when we formulate something like, “The American people believe in our mission of spreading democracy in Iraq, a mission that, if successful, will ultimately protect our regional interests.”

“Interests” is perhaps the most common code-word. It implies a general consensus of interests that all Americans share, but “interests” does not refer to a common set of interests most or all of us share, such as life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. “Interests” as it is generally used means something else entirely. “Interest” almost always refers exclusively to the shared interests of the powerful. In the excerpted texts above, it serves as a euphemism for Washington’s ability to maintain or expand control of Middle Eastern petroleum and the presence of U.S. military forces in the region. For many Americans, maintaining this position by force runs contrary to their interests, which may include not having their loved ones in the armed services killed or maimed and not contributing to the well known and understood dynamics of terrorism.

Some might say that our national interest in the regions’ petroleum reserves is truly shared because it is essential for our economy. Do we all have a common interest in economic prosperity? Yes, obviously. But the tradeoff of armed conflict and control of hydrocarbons versus economic prosperity is a false choice. It is not necessary to keep our economy running that we need this control, the Arab states would still sell to us, but it is necessary for leverage over other nations. Noam Chomsky recently summarized the dynamics and historical precedent,

“Over 60 years ago, the State Department described the oil reserves of the Gulf as "a stupendous source of strategic power" and "one of the greatest material prizes in world history." Iraq is at the heart of the region, and is itself estimated to have the second largest reserves in the world (after Saudi Arabia). Iraqi sources are also very cheap to extract: no deep sea drilling, extraction from tar sands, etc. Establishment of a US client state in Iraq, and a base for long-term military deployment (as is now being implemented), would greatly enhance US dominance over this "stupendous source of strategic power" and ensure that the wealth from this great "material prize" would flow into the preferred hands. That is understood by the more astute policy analysts and planners. One of them, [Carter’s NSA] Zbigniew Brzezinski, pointed out that if the invasion of Iraq succeeded, the US would gain "critical leverage" over its industrial rivals in Europe and Asia. He was reiterating the observations of one of the most important of the early post-war planners, George Kennan, who advised that control over Middle East oil would provide the US with "veto power" over industrial rivals. The same factors enter into the conflicts over pipelines from Central Asia: US planners want to ensure that they go to the West, not the East, and that the pipelines should follow a complicated path to avoid Russia and Iran, so as to ensure US control. China, Russia, and other participants in the Asian Energy Security Grid and Shanghai Cooperation Council naturally have different ideas. Vice-President Dick Cheney, the most influential foreign policy figure in the Bush Administration, observed that control over pipelines can serve as a "tool of intimidation." He was referring of course to control by others, but understands perfectly well that the same is true of US control.”

“Interests” in this context refers to the narrow interests of strengthening American Empire at the expense of peace and security for people everywhere – including Americans. Note also what the use of “American interests” accepts by assumption; namely that any other interests or considerations are not American interests. If you think we should cease our aggressive activities in the region, then your “interests” are not “American.” It is a perverse formulation for a free society, but it mostly passes without notice.

Another code is “democracy” or the verb form “democratization.” Most of us believe democracy is a political system where the people have a say in the government that rules over them. So if we see a politician or pundit talking about “promoting democracy” we think they refer to a policy that encourages greater citizen participation in government. This is not what is meant at all. A “democracy” is defined by a very specific set of criteria. It is a government that is agreeable to American dictates such as providing favorable investment climates for western corporations, obeying Washington when it matters, and a willingness to provide military basing for the U.S. when called upon.

The time period right before the Iraq war offered an excellent insight into how Washington defines “democracy.” The U.S media, following the Bush Administration, divided Europe into two constituencies; old Europe and new Europe. During that time period all European populations were against the impending U.S.-U.K. led war by large majorities. U.S. politicians and pundits derided the governments that acted in accordance to their constituents’ views as decadent “old Europe.” “New European” countries had governments that ignored their populations and acted at Washington’s behest and in doing so were helping to promote democracy.

“Democratization” or “spreading democracy”, as if it is a butter or soft cheese, is frequently hailed as key component of the U.S.’s efforts in Iraq. Again, in this context “democracy” does not mean what most of us think it means. Think about what the consequences of a democratic Iraq would mean for “our interests,” control of the oil spigot and unfettered military access as the phrase is properly understood. It is self-evident that a true democracy is the last thing Washington wants in Iraq. A democratic Iraq would be a Shiite dominated state, closely aligned with Tehran and in almost complete control of its oil reserves to the general exclusion of foreign multinational energy corporations. That would be, and has been historically, intolerable to the U.S. The last century’s history is littered with the corpses of democratic governments the Washington helped overthrow and replace with dictatorships that tried to follow similar democratic trajectories. In fact, the roots of our conflict with Iran go back to a joint U.S. – British engineered coup to overthrow the Iranian nationalist Mohammad Mossedegh in 1953 and replace him with the Shah on behalf of British Petroleum company.

“Democracy” is usually accompanied by several other codewords; like “moderate” or “reform-minded.” These are used to soften criticism for brutal regimes the U.S. allies itself with. It is at once an admission that the favored government is harsh and repressive and an assertion that they are progressing toward reform. U.S. aid is how Washington exercises influence and prods them toward reform. In reality, the reforms and moderation are always a tomorrow away and there is little visible progress. This is another multilayered lie, as I have discussed before with respect to U.S. policy in Uzbekistan. (Here and here)

Another commonplace code-phrase is “American people,” which often refers not to the general population but to the people who matter; most of us don’t. For example, politicians or pundits frequently refer to what the “American people” want or think about something. Often, the views expressed are opposed by a majority of the population. When political operatives or pundits say the “American people” want “victory “in Iraq, they really mean the “American people” in power who are most heavily invested in American empire want to salvage what they can. Most of the American people want the U.S. to leave according to numerous polls. (More on the gulf between what the American people think and what “Americans” want, here.)

I’ll give another example to show this is not just how foreign policy works. Until recently it was widely held that there was no support among the American people for a nationalized health system. The truth is that a clear majority of citizens have favored nationalizing health care for quite some time but the media and politicians ignored them. It was not until major corporations started grumbling about rising health insurance premiums that the discussion opened up. The “American people” (corporate power) now want national health care, or at least they don’t want to pay for it anymore. Actually, you pay for health care even if you get benefits through your company. They look at benefits as part of your employee compensation; the costs are simply deducted from what your wages would be. The problem is that health insurance premiums have risen so fast that employers are not able to adjust worker cash compensation downward fast enough to keep their costs stable and they end up eating some of that premium out of pocket. Bush’s proposal, marketed as a step toward national health care, is actually the first step toward obviating the employer based system. I used to think we would get national health care when corporations stopped wanting to pay for it. That was a mistake in judgment, what we will likely get is a series of reforms that breaks the employer based health care system. The “American people” have spoken.

This is by no means an exhaustive examination of how our political class and media use euphemism and Orwellian meaning to inoculate the general public from discussion. The importance of all this is to develop the ability to decipher the underlying meanings of the language they use; their seeming “mistakes” on public opinion, our interests, what we are doing to people overseas are features, not bugs.